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The catastrophe at Dieppe in 1942, where unsupported infantry attempted to capture a fortified beachhead, showed the allied 
forces how difficult such a venture was. As part of the invasion plan for what became Operation NEPTUNE or the Normandy 
landings, the allied staff saw the need for armoured support for the first waves of troops ashore. This need evolved into the 
concept of ‘swimming tanks’ that would land a few minutes ahead of the first infantry waves. The development of such a weapon 
was undertaken in conditions of absolute secrecy in the UK from late 1942 onwards. This secrecy led to the destruction of much 
of the historical records that relate to these armoured vehicles, leaving a confused and largely unknown record of what was an 
important aspect of WWII.
This project sets out to record the known examples of such vehicles on the coast of the UK including a group lost as part of 
‘Exercise SMASH’, the largest live ammunition exercise of the war, a full scale beach assault training exercise with all supporting 
arms including amphibious tanks. Though six tanks were lost during the exercise in conditions, which are not fully understood, 
the loss led to the changing of the operational plans for D-Day.
Using archaeological and historic data, this project offers an alternative interpretation for these loses and provides a better 
understanding of their subsequent impact on Operation NEPTUNE.
Keywords
World War II, D-Day, Duplex Drive Tanks, Exercise SMASH
Introduction
In late 1941, following the Japanese attacks on Pearl 
Harbour, Hitler and Mussolini declared war on the 
United States (Belcham 1981: 10: Doherty 2011); in 
response, under Prime Minister Churchill and President 
Roosevelt, the American and British forces formed an 
alliance.  Although differences arose in their ideas, their 
defining decision was the large scaled assault of Europe 
to defeat Germany, launched from the British coast 
when the time was right (Belcham 1981: 10; Doherty 
2011). The British Combined Services Committee 
(BCSC) was formed to study methods of gaining access 
to Europe, as by 1942 Nazi Germany had control over 
much of Europe. During the Nazi occupancy of France, 
Hitler had also ordered the construction of the ‘Atlantic 
Wall’. This series of coastal defences running along 
the Channel coastline were constructed between 1942 
and 1945, for the purpose of preventing amphibious 
invasions (Anderson 2010: 61–63). With France being a 
short distance across the Channel, the allied forces also 
needed to pre-empt an invasion of mainland Europe 
to meet the now advancing Soviet army to the east of 
Germany. Furthermore, Stalin was keen for the allied 
forces to create a western front, relieving some of the 
pressure Germany was putting on the Soviet armies.
In response, Churchill and Roosevelt devised the 
largest and most complex invasion ever to take place, 
Operation OVERLORD. The plan was to land forces on 
the northern French coasts, liberate France, then push 
towards Germany. The invasion, which was to take 
place on the Normandy beaches, was named Operation 
NEPTUNE and was described by Churchill as ‘the most 
difficult and complicated operation that has ever taken 
place’ (Winter 2014: 2).
During the planning of the landings on what became 
known as ‘D-Day’, the vast scale of the task at hand 
meant that invaluable cooperation was needed from 
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all of the armed forces including resources and 
specialist equipment. Armoured units were needed to 
eliminate the German defences along the Normandy 
beaches, otherwise high casualties among the infantry 
would prove unacceptable. During the earlier landing 
at Dieppe in August 1942, a force of c. 6000 British, 
Canadian and US infantry was landed suffering heavy 
casualties (Thompson 2011: 38). There, the infantry 
was supposed to be supported by the Canadian 14th 
Army Tank Regiment with their new Churchill tanks; 
these were late arriving, leaving some of the infantry 
unsupported and exposed to German machine gun fire 
(Poolton 1998: 38). Driving the landing craft loaded 
with tanks up to the beach resulted in the Churchill 
tanks getting stuck in the shingle beach, with two 
landing craft reported to have sunk as a consequence 
of this. Those tanks that made it over the sea wall were 
prevented from progressing further due to a mass of 
anti-tank obstacles. The losses were very high, with 60% 
of infantry being either killed or captured (Thompson 
2011).
The failed raid at Dieppe in 1942 led to the formation of 
the 79th Armoured Division, later known as the ‘Hobart 
Funnies,’ in October 1942 under the command of Major-
General P.C.S. Hobart. At this time the Duplex Drive 
(DD) units consisted of the 27th armoured brigade, 
which itself consisted of the 13th/18th Hussars, 4th/7th 
Dragoon Guards and the East Riding Yeomanry, and 
the infantry of 285th brigade. In April 1943, Hobart’s 
division was reformed as the only division in the British 
army made up of just specialised armoured units (Anon 
1945: 9). A series of vehicles designed for specific 
roles during the invasion, including Bridge laying, 
minesweeping, flamethrowers and swimming tanks 
were all developed and extensively tested (Anderson 
2010: 223; Anon 1945: 31). A key feature was the Duplex 
Drive system (DD) i.e. having a transfer box within the 
gears that switch power from the tracks to a single three 
blade propeller. The novel idea of these inventions was 
that they were armoured engineering machines, able 
to assist troops and other vehicles across and off the 
beaches as quickly as possible. To ensure their success 
the special vehicles had to be kept under extreme 
secrecy, for example the DD tank does not appear in the 
normal A.F.V. schedules (AVIA22/456). Additionally, the 
destruction of records was ordered in some cases, ‘All 
papers concerning Exercise SMASH will be destroyed 
after the final conference’ (WO199/2320). This high 
level of secrecy was maintained throughout the build-
up to D-Day (Anon 1945).
Development
Nicholas Straussler was a boat builder specialising 
in floatation devices. He began working for Vickers-
Armstrong designing tank accessories. The idea of 
amphibious tanks had been studied by several nations 
prior to the war (Fletcher 2006: 3). Many concepts were 
devised but Straussler eventually broached the idea of 
Duplex Drive swimming tank. The Duplex Drive tank 
works by having a transfer box within the gears that 
switch power from the tracks to a single three-blade 
propeller (two propellers on the later Sherman tanks) 
(Anderson 2010: 23). Flotation being provided by a 
canvas screen erected using compressed air filled tubes, 
given shape by a series of tubular supports running 
around the circumference of the tank (Doherty 2011: 
51; WO185/66). Once the tank has ‘swum’ ashore after 
leaving its transport the Landing Craft Tank (LCT) at sea, 
the drive reverts to the tracks and the screen is lowered 
and propeller(s) raised (Fletcher 2006; WO185/66).
The British took on the idea of Duplex Drive (DD) tanks 
and Straussler was provided with an 8-ton Tetrarch Mk 
VII from the 1st Armoured Division in July 1940 to begin 
work on his prototype (WO185/66; AVIA22/1522). The 
Tetrarch prototype was fitted with an outboard motor 
for propulsion, technically making it not a DD tank. 
The resulting prototype was trialled around the Brent 
Reservoir in June 1941, and in September the Tank 
Board agreed Straussler’s design would be applied to the 
Vickers-Armstrong Valentine and later the Sherman 
tank (Fletcher 2006: 6–7; WO185/66; AVIA22/1522).
On 6 July 1942, the first order for 450 sets of DD 
equipment was made prior to the seaworthiness trials 
due to the equipment being a ‘matter of great urgency’ 
(WO185/66). The DD tanks were all placed under the 
command of Hobart’s division (Anon 1945: 9). Hobart 
began his career in 1904, a Royal Engineer throughout 
the First World War, his career continued through to 
the end of the Second World War. He was described 
as a determined leader who the war office received 
countless comments about as being ‘impossible to work 
with’ (Macksey 1967: 12). Nonetheless he was a devoted 
patriot with high expectations and a sense of urgency, 
an inspiration and irritation (Duncan 1972: 1). After 
transferring to the Royal Tank Corps in 1923 he was 
responsible for the training of some of the best known 
and most successful armoured divisions of the Second 
World War including the 7th Armoured Division, better 
known as the Desert Rats, the 11th Armoured Division, 
acknowledged as the best British armoured unit in 
Europe and the creation of one of the most important 
aspects of success on D-Day, the 79th Armoured Division 
(Macksey 1967).
While the DD tanks would not directly operate under the 
79th Armoured Division, Hobart would be responsible 
for the training (Doherty 2011: 51). Most training in 
Britain took place using Valentine tanks and Hobart 
eventually trained ten regiments from Britain, Canada 
and the United States (Anon 1945: 9; Fletcher 1984: 23).
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By the time D-Day was approaching the light Valentine 
tank had become out-dated compared to other allied 
and German tanks, both in terms of firepower and 
armour (Fletcher 1984: 23). The Sherman tank had 
become the main battle tank of the allied forces during 
1943 and was the most obvious choice for conversion. 
While both vehicles could be made to float, the most 
notable difference was the additional propeller found 
of the Sherman DD thus increasing its power. The 
canvas screen on the Valentine was double thickness for 
support and to help prevent puncturing although once 
the DD equipment was adapted for the Sherman tank, 
the lower section was increased to triple thickness to 
help maintaining seaworthiness (Doherty 2011: 56). The 
forward position of the turret on the Valentine meant 
that the gun had to face the rear to raise the screen; the 
Sherman tank turret could remain facing forward while 
the screen was raised, allowing it to come into action 
much quicker.
Training
Extensive testing and training was conducted in the 
development of the equipment in the build-up to D-Day 
at sites around Great Britain, including Castle Toward 
and Moray Firth, Linney Head, Gosport, Westward 
Ho!, Bridlington, Slapton Sands, and Studland Bay. 
Freshwater training was also conducted including 
Fritton Lake in Norfolk (Doherty 2011; Fletcher 2006; 
Hills 2003). Trials involved launching and landing 
practice, live firing landings, seaworthiness, and 
exposure to small arms fire.
The first stage of DD tank training took place at Fritton 
Lake (also known as Decoy Lake) which was owned 
by an admiral who gave the army permission to turn 
it into the freshwater DD training school known as ‘A’ 
wing (Delaforce 1988: 66; WO166/10710). Tank parks 
and workshops were rapidly built—one of the earliest 
installations being dummy landing craft ramps to 
practice deployment from, swimming in offensive 
lines, along with the varying steepness of the lake’s 
banks providing exiting practice (Macksey 1967: 250). 
The 79th Armoured Brigade started their freshwater 
training wing at Fritton Lake on 8 June 1943 upon the 
closing of Narford Lake where initial trials occurred 
(WO166/1096; WO166/10710).
The main saltwater training school was ‘B’ wing at 
Gosport. Upon the opening of ‘B’ wing on 1 November 
1943, the 79th specialist saltwater training school for 
the use of DD tanks, under the command of Colonel 
Nigel Duncan was based here. Based at Stokes Bay, the 
Solent offered many different landing beaches within 
near reach, and there are several mentioned during 
training and exercise. There is evidence to suggest 
landings at Osborne Bay and Barton Head on the Isle of 
Wight, as well as further landing sites at Hayling Island, 
Bracklesham Bay and Littlehampton during Operation 
FABIUS. FABIUS was the final and largest rehearsal for 
D-Day, taking place over several days at the end of April 
and beginning of May 1944 (WO199/1396).
Hobart and his team of instructors successfully put 
ten Divisions through the saltwater school prior to the 
D-Day landings. The training was intense and covered 
all possible eventualities and is what made Hobart 
and his 79th division so well known. While at ‘B’ wing 
the tank crews would practice vehicle maintenance, 
launching and swimming practice at all times of day 
and night. During the operation of ‘B’ wing over 30,000 
launches were conducted with the known loss of only 
one tank (Anon 1945: 15; Daniels 2003: 25; Delaforce 
1998: 67; Doherty 2003: 57).
Full-scale exercises took place to prepare for the 
complex coordination required to make the D-Day 
landing a success. Rehearsal exercises were high risk in 
terms of German intelligence, the rehearsals involving 
the army infantry, navy bombardment and the air force. 
Exercises such as Operation FABIUS, SMASH and the 
American rehearsal Operation TIGER at Slapton Sands 
ended in huge loss of life after a German E-boat attack 
prior to the exercise (Manousos 2014; Zaloga 2012: 18).
Studland Bay
Studland Bay was used on occasion as opposed to the 
B wing training school further along the coast in the 
Solent. There the 4th/7th Dragoon Guards gave a full 
demonstration of LCT loading procedures on 11 and 
12 December 1943 in front of Hobart upon completion 
of their training at B wing (WO166/11070). This was 
the first time that a complete unit of DD tanks was 
launched from LCT at once (WO205/750). During 
this trial the tanks were launched from 1500 yards 
(c. 1400m) instead of the planned 3,000 yards but it 
reads that all tanks landed with two minor mechanical 
breakdowns (WO205/750). The memo goes on to say 
that ‘from a technical point of view this exercise proves 
conclusively that the DD tank is a very formidable new 
weapon’ (WO205/750). The main lesson learnt here was 
that the most dangerous period for the DD tank is its 
launch from the LCT (WO205/750). Studland Bay also 
had several other functions in relation to the DD tanks. 
By 20 December 1943, three ‘hards’  (ramps used for 
the loading of LCT’s and other landing craft types) had 
been constructed for the 3rd Canadian Division to carry 
out exercises (WO205/749). Further trials to take place 
at Studland included driving a DD Sherman through 
a simulated flame barrage attack known as Project 
FOUGASSE (Petroleum Warfare Material 1943) This 
involved setting fire to oil on the sea, then the DD drove 
through the flames unharmed using a device called a 
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Belch that would suck up seawater and then squirt it 
over the canvas skirt (Doherty 2011: 54; Fletcher 2006: 
24, 34; Fletcher 1984: 21). Studland Bay then became 
best known for exercise SMASH—one of the biggest live 
firing rehearsals of the Second World War. 
Exercise SMASH I
Exercise SMASH was the code name given to a series 
of live fire beach assault training exercises taking place 
between 3 and 23 April 1944 in preparation for the 
Normandy landings on 6 June 1944. The first of these 
exercises was codenamed SMASH I.
Like D-Day itself ‘SMASH I’ was postponed by 24 
hours due to the weather, eventually taking place at 
dawn on 4 April. The aim of ‘SMASH I’ was to assault 
the beaches of Studland and establish a beachhead, 
observed by a number of ‘Class A’ (VIPS such as senior 
officers, commanders and government officials) in 
Fort Henry, (WO199/2321) a purpose-built bunker 
overlooking the beach, which included King George VI, 
Winston Churchill and General Dwight D. Eisenhower. 
In addition, 400 ‘Class B’ officers watched the exercises 
from Ballard Down. The assault was planned to take 
place on two sections of the beach designated ‘King 
Green’ and ‘King White’ but due the presence of the 
training bank, a human-made breakwater which covers 
at high water alongside the main shipping channel into 
Poole, the approach to ‘King Green’ would be restricted 
(WO199/2321) (Figure 1). 
As part of this exercise two squadrons of DD tanks 
from the 4th/7th Royal Dragoon Guards were launched 
from ten LCT 3s, each with 5 Valentines to support the 
infantry landings of the 50th Northumbrian Division 
and securing a series of objectives on land. The official 
war diary states that the loss of the ‘special craft’ 
was due to ‘the wind getting up with a strong sea’ 
(Bovington Tank Museum 2014) and the deaths of 6 
men: ‘Lt. C.R. Gould, Sgt. Hartley, Cpl. Park 84, Tpr. Kirby 
and Tpr. Petty all of C Squadron, and Cpl. Townson of B 
Squadron’. In addition, a 7th DD ran aground, probably 
on the training bank. This DD maintained its buoyancy 
floating off in the next tide, drifting off more than 5km 
before being sunk by naval gun fire to prevent the vessel 
falling into the wrong hands (Stirling 1946: 43–44). After 
the exercise was concluded the relevant officers held 
a conference after which all documents concerning 
Exercise SMASH were destroyed. One outcome of the 
Figure 1. The positions and headings of the tanks in relation to the landing beaches of King White and Green (© Crown 
Copyright/SeaZone Solutions). All Rights Reserved. Licence No. 052006.001 31st July 2011. Not to be used for Navigation.
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losses was the appointment of a Regimental Officer as 
an advisor to Naval HQ on whether conditions were 
suitable to launch DD tanks (Doherty 2003: 54).
Circumstances of the losses
With the official records apparently destroyed details 
of the operation are based on eyewitness statements 
and the archaeological record. The official accounts 
give weather as the primary reason for the loss of six 
tanks. The weather report for Portland shows the wind 
on 4 April 1944 to be a steady force 4 from the south-
west all day (Meteorological Office, 1944), and out in 
the bay waves of up to 1m could be expected. Further, 
the exercise took place over the high-water slacks with 
the tide at c. 1.6m above chart datum and at this state 
of the tide the training bank that usually sheltered the 
training exercises would be completely covered.
Lt (subsequently General Sir) Robert Ford later said of 
the incidents: 
…We were on the surface of the water after coming 
off the landing craft and becoming increasingly 
apprehensive. The water was coming in very fast 
and although we had small pumps, they were just 
not effective. The weight of the water against the 
canvas was just too great. We knew we weren’t 
going to make it. We were still floating and all four 
of us were standing on the top of the tank. Then a 
great wave crashed over the top and we sank to the 
bottom … (Bournemouth Daily Echo 2005).
The suggestion that the tank sank almost immediately 
after coming off the landing craft is correlated by 
another trooper of the 4th/7th Royal Dragoon Guards, 
R.W. Mole (1993), who describes waves ‘slopping in’ as 
the tank exited the landing craft leading to it being 
front heavy and going straight down, with some others 
drifting off before sinking.
Major J.D.P Stirling states the DDs were ‘launched in a 
very heavy swell but one which was adjudged to be fit for 
launching’ (Stirling 1946: 43). He continues that shortly 
after launching the tanks the weather changed for the 
worse, ‘the wind increased, the waves grew bigger, and 
the tanks began to get into difficulties’ (Stirling 1946: 
43). As the weather reports for the day showed no sign 
of changing it is likely that the DDs turned into the 
wind giving the impression of increased swell.
These eyewitness accounts attribute the heavy sea 
conditions as a cause for the loss but it is known 
from previous trials of DD tanks that they only had a 
freeboard of 12” (c. 35cm) in Force 1-3 winds with a 
calm sea state (ADM1/13246). This meant that even 
in moderate seas it could be expected that the tanks 
would take on water. Given the fact that the majority of 
the DD tanks launched at SMASH I reached the beach, 
other factors may have played a role in the loss of the 
six tanks.
While the DDs at SMASH I were launched from modified 
LCT 3s, prior to 1944 most launches were off LCT 4s 
and a letter (WO205/747: 9411) dated 24 December 
1943 raises doubts that sufficient training and trials 
had taken place; and, whether under ‘operational 
conditions’ that DDs could be successfully launched 
from LCT 3s. In addition to this many of the DD training 
schools had not received the newly modified LCT 3s 
suggesting that the LCT 3 and DD crews had little 
experience in launching at sea especially if conditions 
Figure 2. Tidal graph for the 4th April 1944 showing little tidal movement at the time of the 
exercise 07:40 after UKHO (2014) ‘ (© Crown Copyright and/or database rights). Reproduced by 
permission of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office and the UK Hydrographic Office 
(www.GOV.uk/UKHO).’
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were not ideal. This contrasts with the large amount of 
training in deploying from LCT 4s. Given the weight of 
a Valentine, c. 16 tonnes, each time the LCT unloaded a 
tank its displacement and distribution of weight would 
have changed—in combination with the bad weather 
this could have led to the tank sinking directly after 
leaving the landing craft.
The positions given for the remains of the seven 
Valentine tanks lost in Exercise SMASH varies greatly. 
In 2014, Bournemouth University undertook a study 
to accurately position the tanks and assess their rate 
of survival (Manosous 2014). This study successfully 
located all seven DDs using geophysical survey 
techniques and showed that the five tanks listed in the 
National Historic List for England (then the NMR) were 
over 100m out from the beach.
The plot of the DDs (Figure 1) revealed that Tanks 1 and 
2 are close to the 5000 yard line (c. 4500m) from the 
beach on a westerly heading and within 100m of each 
other suggesting that these tanks are either from the 
same squadron launching close by or from the same 
LCT.
The other tanks present somewhat more of a mystery. 
These tanks appear to be running in two lines in a 
south-south-west direction heading far to the north 
of the landing beach. Given the slack state of the tide 
(0.3kts in an northerly direction) (Figure 2) (UKHO 
2017) and their low freeboard, and therefore windage 
on the vessels, it is unlikely that they drifted any 
distance from their disembarkation point suggesting 
that they were launched parallel to the shore and had 
to head south into the wind to avoid running aground 
on the training bank as Tank 7 did, as this would expose 
the blunt bow of the vessel to the full force of the wind 
and tide possibly leading to their sinking.
Significance and lack of protection of the tanks
Their operational successes
The importance of the DD tanks and other specially 
developed vehicles aiding the infantry making progress 
off the beaches on D-Day is highlighted by Omaha 
beach. The beach head, codenamed Omaha, was the 
responsibility of the First US Army led by 1 US and 
followed up by 29 US divisions. The 741st Division 
consisted of 32 DD tanks, 29 of these were launched at 
5000 yards into a choppy, tidal sea (Belcham 1981: 86; 
Fletcher 2006: 22). The result of this involved 27 of the 
tanks being swept off course and swamped. Two of the 
DDs made it onto the beach and a further three were not 
launched and landed straight onto the beach (Belcham 
1981: 86; Fletcher 2006: 23). When this lack of armoured 
support is combined with the lack of other specialised 
equipment such as flails, the difficult terrain of a rising 
beach and Hitler’s formidable Atlantic wall, casualties 
ran high. The clearance of beach defences was slowed 
by the requirement of infantry engineers, with infantry 
progressing only a few hundred yards by nightfall 
(Anon 1945: 53). Whereas on Sword Beach for example, 
the infantry was supported by a full complement 
of specialised armour and successful landings (33 
tanks landing), made quick progress, advancing 
approximately a mile and a half by 0930 (Belcham 1981: 
108). The combined British and Canadian casualties 
over the course of D-Day are estimated to be around 
4200 across the three landing beaches. The American’s 
casualties were about 6000 on two beaches with around 
half of these casualties being during the Omaha Beach 
assault (Anon 1945: 53; Belcham 1981: 118; Duncan 1972: 
25; Fletcher 2006: 23).
The success of the specialised armour on D-Day is shown 
in their use during later operations. The crossing of the 
Rhine—Operation PLUNDER—was undertaken by the 
Staffordshire Yeomanry (Saunders 2006: 87) occurring 
under the cover of darkness on 23 March 1945. For the 
Rhine crossing, initial training took place on Fritton 
Lake with further training undertaken at Burton-on-
Sather where the Staffordshire Yeomanry trained 
specifically in the crossing of rivers (Fletcher 2006: 
36). Further training wings were opened on the River 
Mass and the Waal (Doherty 2011: 164; Fletcher 2006: 
37). Prior to Operation PLUNDER, landings took place at 
Beveland, the river Elbe and the river Po (Doherty 2011; 
Fletcher 2006: 38). The US army utilised the DD tanks 
successfully for Operation DRAGOON, the amphibious 
invasion of southern France on 15 August 1944. Twenty 
DD tanks were launched from their LCTs, and 16 
successfully made the beach (Zaloga 2012: 28).  At least 
one Sherman DD was lost off Italy by the 753rd battalion 
during the training for Operation DRAGOON in July 
1944 (Duncan 2017). DD Valentines also being shipped 
out to north Africa and the Middle East (WO32/10523). 
The memoir of John Leyin of the 25th Dragoons (Leyin 
2003) recalls his training in India for the amphibious 
landings in Japanese occupied Malaya. The success of 
the DD tanks was clear. Clearly they are of considerable 
military significance.
The protection of the submerged DD tanks
Historic England recognise the significance of the 
exercise as seen in their listing of Fort Henry, the 
Bunker built for the VIPs to observe the exercise, as a 
Grade II Listed Building (List entry Number: 1411809). 
As one of the key parts of the exercise and D-Day 
itself the tanks played a vital role in the history of 
Europe with only a handful of DD Valentines known 
to have survived. Of the Poole Bay Tanks, all have been 
heavily salvaged with four of the six lost off Studland 
having been partially destroyed by the Navy in 1987 
to prevent salvage of munitions by sports divers. Tank 
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2, which had the turret blown off, was salvaged by 
sports divers in 1989, the material recovered showed 
a remarkable level of preservation with material such 
as cardboard and personal items such as shaving kits 
and leather belts surviving (pers. comm. Nigel Bryant). 
With Tank 1 still intact the archaeological potential 
of the tank and, therefore, its significance is greatly 
increased; however, there is no desire from Historic 
England to protect the tanks under the Protection of 
the Wrecks Act 1973 (Protection of Wreck Act 1973) as 
although they were travelling under their own power 
they are not recognised as ‘wrecks’. Historic England 
has also changed their policy specifically so as to not 
designate the vessels under the Ancient Monuments 
and Archaeological Areas Act 1979 (Ancient Monuments 
and Archaeological Areas Act 1979), which defines 
monument to include ‘any vehicle, vessel, aircraft or 
other movable structure’. Even though they recognise 
the tanks as being of ‘national importance’ it is Historic 
England’s policy not to use the 1979 Act to schedule 
below the Mean Low Water mark (Historic England 
2015). It should be noted that Historic England has 
designated protection to at least one vessel, a WW2 
Phoenix Caisson, which lies 660m beyond the low water 
mark in 2013 (List entry Number: 1415588), as well as 
several wrecks in the Intertidal Zone between high 
and low water marks. Historic Scotland and Cadw have 
also used the 1979 Act to protect shipwrecks below the 
low water mark such as the German High Seas Fleet at 
Scapa Flow.
Under the current UK legislation only the 1979 Act can 
be used to protect underwater cultural heritage (UCH), 
which cannot be identified as wreck. The failure to 
schedule these vehicles, despite their acknowledged 
national importance, especially when compared to 
the scheduling of surface monuments, would appear 
to show a ‘sea blindness’ on the part of the heritage 
authorities in dealing with UCH.  
Conclusion
The intended use for the tanks was the Normandy 
Landings during D-Day, and much attention is drawn 
to Omaha Beach where the DD tanks failed to make 
the beaches due to bad weather. The units on the 
other beaches successfully deployed the tanks and 
experienced much lower casualties. The DD tanks 
therefore, played an important role in the Normandy 
Landings despite the high number of casualties on 
Omaha Beach. The success of the DD tank on D-Day lead 
to further successful amphibious landings, including 
Italy, providing vital support in multiple operations 
during the allied advance, such as Operation PLUNDER, 
the crossing of the Rhine (Fletcher 2006: 37). Without 
the DD tanks and the other specialised armour of the 
79th Division the Normandy Invasion may not have 
gone as planned with many historians believing that 
the Soviets would have continued their push beyond 
Germany and could have even led to atomic war in 
Europe (BBC 2014).
Little work has gone into the investigation of the 
known DD tanks, beyond that being conducted by 
Bournemouth University (2014). The only known work 
to be carried out is on locating and recording of those 
lost during exercise SMASH and the one at Bracklesham 
Bay, with Manousos’ (2014) concluding remarks on the 
tanks being that they are actively decaying and being 
actively salvaged, thus highlighting the importance of 
recording these vehicles while still possible. No other 
DD tanks are recognised to be within English waters; a 
Sherman DD lost in Exercise TIGER was raised in 1984 
and is now on permanent display on Slapton Sands as a 
memorial to the lives lost during Exercise TIGER.
The extensive development of such a new idea shows 
the importance of the equipment, as authorities strived 
to maintain secrecy while developing and trialling 
at an extensive list of locations, combined with the 
struggle to produce the numbers needed for training 
and operational use. While the deliberately fragmented 
records and widespread coverage of the use of DD’s 
makes this difficult, the significance and potential 
presence of these vehicles within the archaeological 
records is limited due to their secret nature.
The topic, therefore, should be studied to its fullest 
potential, such fragmented records being deliberately 
discrete over the nature of the equipment due to 
their success relying on secrecy. With very limited 
archaeological investigation being undertaken to 
locate, record and learn from those tanks within 
the archaeological records, further work must be 
undertaken to fully appreciate the role that these 
tanks played throughout the war.  Many features of 
the war are well remembered, and deservedly so, 
with many protected structures, ships and aircraft 
within the archaeological records and the public 
eye. Many elements of D-Day have already received 
deserved recognition and protection, either through 
the Protection of Military Remains Act, as scheduled 
monuments or listed buildings. While features of the 
operation SMASH have already been listed (Fort Henry), 
the tanks have been noted for national importance 
but not offered any form of protection. The DD tanks 
were an important aspect of D-Day and one with such 
little archaeological presence should represent an 
ideal candidate for protection. The DD tanks are yet to 
receive the appreciation they deserved for their role 
in the Normandy landings, attention being drawn to 
their great losses at Omaha Beach. Little attention has 
previously been paid to the extensive investment that 
the War Office put into these tanks and their successful 
role in the penetrating of ‘fortress Europe’.
Thomas Cousins, Thomas Harrison and Dave Parham
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